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Abstract
The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD), made famous by the television game show Let’s Make a Deal, can be an
effective teaching tool with wide ranging behavioral science applications. The format and history of the
problem are presented as well as experimental data and variations on the original design. Strategic game
playing choices are discussed from several perspectives including statistics, decision making, social and
personality psychology, and cognitive functioning. Because the classroom exercise is engaging and
counterintuitive, it challenges students to generate explanatory ideas that draw from multiple perspectives. It
exemplifies the type of detective work and creative thinking that is central to doing research in the behavioral
sciences, and it can be applied to fields as diverse as sociology, religious studies, biology, and behavioral
economics.
Keywords
Monty Hall, Decision-Making, Probability, Statistics, Committment, Regret, Teaching Psychology
Creative Commons License
Creative
Commons
Attribution-
Noncommercial-
No
Derivative
Works
4.0
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.
Cover Page Footnote
Address correspondence to Kevin Bennett, Penn State Beaver, Department of Psychology, Monaca, PA
15061; via e-mail: klb48@psu.edu
INTRODUCTION
The original version of Monty Hall’s Let’s Make a Deal was a suc-
cessful television program for over 25 years because the rules 
were uncomplicated and the prizes were deceptively easy to win. 
The game show posed a frustratingly simple dilemma to contes-
tants: stay with your initial guess or switch to another option. 
Aside from Hollywood embellishments, like offering cash to in-
fluence choices and encouraging audience members to dress in 
outrageous costumes, the format was relatively straight forward. 
In addition to addressing probability issues in statistics, the Mon-
ty Hall Dilemma (MHD) can be used to teach a number of issues 
in the behavioral science and beyond. I like to challenge students 
to tackle the problem from several perspectives including statis-
tics, decision making, social and personality psychology, and cog-
nitive functioning. One of the outcomes of teaching MHD is that 
students – guided by spirited class discussion – are often inspired 
to push the problem far beyond its original form. Examples of 
this include applications to behavioral economics, sociology, and 
religion. 
Benefit to the Scholarship of Teaching and 
Learning
The Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) will benefit 
from the ideas presented here in at least two important ways: (1) 
Following the work of Bass (1999), the application of MHD is ac-
cessible to others practicing teaching and learning. In this sense, 
it is consistent with the view that rather than private practice, 
teaching should be public and community oriented (Huber, 2009; 
Hutchings, 2007). (2) Central to the concept of SoTL is the idea 
that teaching is a window into student learning. As such, when 
content is pulled from different fields, philosophical orientation, 
methodologies, and interests, these works should share an inter-
section that that is focused on improved student learning. (Gilpin, 
2007). The MHD game discussed here provides support for both 
of these key points. 
Playing the Monty Hall Game
The game show is easy to reproduce in class and typically takes 
this format: Monty Hall, a thoroughly honest game show host, has 
placed a new car behind one of three doors. There is a goat be-
hind each of the other doors. “First, you point toward a door,” he 
says. “Then I’ll open one of the other doors to reveal a goat. After 
I’ve shown you the goat, you make your final choice, and you win 
whatever is behind that door.” You begin by pointing to a door, 
say door 1. Monty, knowing full well what is behind all the doors, 
shows you that door 3 has a goat. What will your final choice 
be? Stick with door 1? Or, Switch to door 2? (See Figure 1). Of 
course, it is assumed that you desire the car, not one of the goats. 
The correct strategy, if you want to win the car more often 
than not, is to always switch doors! Don’t give this up right away – 
let students wrestle with the decision. Here is how it works. The 
probability of winning under the stay-strategy is .33. Only when 
the initial choice is correct can a player win under this strate-
gy. Many people think that a switch-strategy will not improve 
chances for winning, but it does. The initial pick is always random 
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Figure 1. The basic format of the Monty Hall Dilemma requires three 
doors and uses these instructions
Monty Hall, a thoroughly honest game-show host, has placed a new car 
behind one of three doors. There is a goat behind each of the other doors. 
“First, you point toward a door,” he says. “Then I’ll open one of the other 
doors to reveal a goat. After I’ve shown the goat, you make your final 
choice, and you win whatever is behind that door.” You begin by pointing 
to door number 1.
Door #1 Door #2 Door #3
Monty then shows you that door 3 has a goat:
Door #1 Door #2 Door #3
What would your final choice be?
____ Stick with door 1 ____ Switch to door 2
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(door 1, 2, or 3), but the information the host reveals about one 
of the other doors is not random. The switch-strategy essentially 
minimizes the chances of losing because a loss will only occur 
when the initial choice is correct (33% of the time this will be 
true). Thus, a switch-strategy will produce a win 67% of the time 
(1 - .33 = .67). Table 1 provides a list of all possible outcomes 
under both strategies and demonstrates that the switch-strategy 
doubles the probability of winning the prize. For a mathematical 
proof using probability notation see Selvin (1975).
Several options exist for demonstrating this in class. Most 
teachers don’t have access to a fully operational television studio 
complete with doors, cars, and goats. I prefer three large cards 
with prizes drawn on the opposite sides. This reassures students 
that the game is not fixed. As the host, you need to be aware of 
what is behind all the doors before you turn one over, so be sure 
you set up the cards so that you are the only one with access 
to the back sides. A computer presentation would also work, 
but for this task it might be wise to let parsimony carry the day. 
Besides, cynical audience members might question the veracity 
of your performance if they detect even the slightest whiff of 
technological legerdemain. For added reality, one could raise the 
stakes by replacing the car prize with extra credit points and 
allowing the students play whatever strategy they wish. How-
ever, student anxiety being what it is, the most comfortable and 
controlled approach might be to play with pretend prizes. Assign 
half of the class to play the stay-strategy and half to play the 
switch-strategy. Across trials, those who play the switch-strategy 
will have more success.
The MHD poses at least two teaching challenges. The first 
is to get students to understand why the correct strategy is to 
switch. This is part of the intrigue of the problem, but many stu-
dents will express disbelief over this solution. Don’t be surprised 
if you are ambushed with incredulous statements along the lines 
of “how can that be?” or “it just doesn’t make sense.” An effective 
way to convince doubters is to follow the demonstration with 
an examination of all the possible outcomes (Table 1). I’ve found 
that emphasizing the probability of winning under the stay-strat-
egy and emphasizing the probability of losing under the switch 
strategy is most helpful. In addition, encourage students to try 
the game on friends or, as I did, by conducting a solo empirical in-
vestigation comparing success rates using three cards and a com-
mitment to act honestly as host and contestant simultaneously. 
A second challenge involves focusing classroom discussion on 
the relevant psychological explanations that account for perfor-
mance on this task (performance is poor, as we shall see below). 
Students will undoubtedly have opinions on this matter – some 
will be intuitive, others will be grounded in theory. The following 
sections address both of these classroom challenges.
History of the Problem
Increased attention over the past decade has moved the MHD 
from a peripheral issue in mathematics to the prevailing current 
of modern psychology. For example, Kelley (2004) illustrates this 
hot topic in the context of cognitive shortcuts, but the MHD is 
hardly new. Versions of this problem have been traced back to 
17th century philosophy texts, but the first contemporary form 
appeared in a 1959 issue of Scientific American in the “Mathe-
matical Games” section. The structure of the problem was the 
same, but the story involved a governor’s pardon being given to 
one of three prisoners (Gardner, 1959a, 1959b). The dilemma 
became well known between 1963 and 1990 on Monty Hall’s 
television show, but the controversy over the correct solution 
started after Marilyn vos Savant presented this problem to her 
readers and said that the best strategy was to switch (vos Savant, 
1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 199b). vos Savant, the popular columnist 
and Guinness Book record holder of highest I.Q., stood by her 
answer despite the thousands of letters insisting she was wrong. 
Of all the letters she received, 92% said she was wrong. Of the 
letters from universities, 65% were against her answer. The de-
bate that followed was acrimonious, but in the end she proved 
to be correct. For an enlightening discussion of false solutions 
see Morgan, Chaganty, Dahiya, and Doviak (1991a, 1991b, 1991c). 
Experimental Data and Variations 
of the Game
The problem has generated debate among statisticians, mathe-
maticians, and the popular press (Tierney, 1991), paving the way 
for psychologists to inquire about actual performance. In gen-
Table 1. All possible outcomes for stay and switch strategies in the 
Monty Hall Dilemma
All possible outcomes for stay-strategy::
Correct Door 
(unknown to 
contestant)
1st
Choice
Exposed
Door
2nd
Choice Result
A A B or C A WIN
A B C B lose
A C B C lose
B A C A lose
B B A or C B WIN
B C A C lose
C A B A lose
C B A B lose
C C A or B C WIN
3 / 9 WINS = 33%
All possible outcomes for switch-strategy::
Correct Door 
(unknown to 
contestant)
1st
Choice
Exposed
Door
2nd
Choice Result
A B C A WIN
A C B A WIN
A A B or C C or B lose
B A C B WIN
B C A B WIN
B B A or C C or A lose
C A B C WIN
C B A C WIN
C C B or A A or B lose
6 / 9 WINS = 67%
Note:  The correct strategy is to always switch .  Using a stay-strategy, 
winning will occur only when the first choice is correct (33% win).  Using 
a switch-strategy, losing will occur only when first choice is correct (33% 
lose and 1-33% = 67% win).  Because the game show host always knows 
the correct door, he or she will sometimes have a choice between expos-
ing two doors (e.g., B or C).
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eral, research suggests that people are terrible at getting this 
problem correct, especially the first time around. Granberg and 
Brown (1995) found that only 13% of subjects opted to switch 
on the first trial (the correct answer), and Granberg and Dorr 
(1998) found 8% were willing to switch. Similar rates are found 
cross-culturally: Brazil 13%, China 21%, Sweden 17%, and U.S. 
16% (Granberg, 1999). Students will be pleased to learn that they 
are not the only ones performing below optimality.
Even when participants play the game over many trials they 
have a difficult time learning inductively to switch. In one study, 
switching was very low at the beginning (about 10%) and reached 
a plateau between 50 – 60% near the end of 50 trials (Granberg 
& Dorr, 1998). One might expect that after many trials individuals 
would learn the best strategy and switching would hover closer 
to 100%. This is not the case.
In the symmetrical counterpart to the game, called the Rus-
sian Roulette Dilemma (Granberg & Brown, 1995), subjects are 
told that there are two cars and only one goat behind the three 
doors. A door is picked (say door 1), and then a car is exposed 
behind one of the two remaining doors (say door 3). What would 
your final choice be? Stick or switch? In this scenario, it is correct 
to stay with your first pick because the probability of picking a 
door with a car on the initial guess is .67. This probability does 
not change when the host deliberately shows that one of the 
other doors has a car behind it. Results show that 31% of people 
switch (the wrong strategy) and 69% of people stay (the correct 
strategy). Although almost 70% of people use the correct strat-
egy here, a larger number of people than in the original version 
feel that switching is the best approach. For the most part, when 
people should stay in order to maximize benefits, they do so. 
When they should switch, however, there is an overwhelming 
tendency to stay.
In another version of the game, Granberg and Dorr (1998) 
measured the effect of switch vs. stay strategies after manipulat-
ing the total number of doors used in the experiment and the 
number of incorrect doors shown. The total number of doors 
varied between three, five, and seven. For each of those condi-
tions, either one incorrect door was opened or N-2 incorrect 
doors are opened (all but one incorrect door). Showing all but 
one incorrect door should make the solution less ambiguous as 
the total number of doors increases. For example, in the case 
of N=7 doors, let’s say the player picks door 1. The host then 
exposes 5 incorrect doors leaving only the initial pick and one 
other door. Should you switch to the other door or stay with 
your initial pick? Statistically, you should switch doors because 
of the advantage you get with each door that is opened. Each 
incorrect door that is exposed provides additional information. 
Results for a one-trial experiment do not show this trend. In fact, 
25% of the people switch when there are 7 total doors and only 
1 incorrect door is shown, but only 11% switch when there are 
7 total doors and 5 incorrect doors are shown. 
Across 50 trials, the percentage switching on the final 10 tri-
als increases for all the conditions, but seems to top out around 
50-60% for the conditions where one incorrect door is shown. 
For the conditions in which N-2 incorrect doors are shown, the 
percent switching is much higher. With 5 total doors and 3 in-
correct exposed, the percent switching is 76%, and with 7 doors 
and 5 incorrect exposed the percentage is 87%. One might ex-
pect this percentage to increase as conditions with more doors 
are included. When enough information is provided it seems that 
people can adopt the correct strategy, to some extent, if they 
practice over many trials. 
Psychology Applications
What use does the field of psychology have for a game show that 
first aired over 50 years ago? In general, research on the MHD 
shows that people have a propensity to stay with an initial hunch 
when they should switch. With few exceptions, it is not easy for 
people to learn to switch when they ought to. This consistent 
finding can be used as a centerpiece for exploring a number of 
topics. 
Commitment and Regret. Some researchers have argued that 
people are using a cognitive heuristic of mental simulation when 
they play this game. “How will I feel if I switch and lose?” they 
ask themselves, and “How will I feel if I stay and lose?” Gilovich, 
Medvec, and Chen (1995) used the MHD to demonstrate that 
people who switch and then lose experience more regret and 
psychological pain than those who stay and lose. Similarly, some 
students experience this when they change their answers on a 
multiple choice test only to learn afterwards that their initial 
hunch was correct.
Perhaps there is something special about making a commit-
ment? Is there an intimate relationship between commitment, 
regret, and pain? Researchers have observed that there is an 
inconsistency between “experimental regret” and what people 
say about “everyday regret.” It is common to hear people say, 
when reflecting upon the past, that they regret the things that 
they haven’t done in life (e.g., talked to an attractive person, gone 
skydiving, etc.). Laboratory data suggest just the opposite – that 
people regret acts of commission that have negative outcomes 
more than acts of omission that have negative outcomes (Gi-
lovich, Medvec, & Chen, 1995). Most of us would feel distressed 
over losing out on a lottery jackpot after we had changed our 
numbers from the winning combination to some other pick. It 
would probably be better just to lose with our first pick.
Decision Making Bias. What is the underlying cognitive psy-
chology being played out with the MHD? The initial selection 
in the game may result in a cognitive bias that inhibits switch-
ing from the first choice. Granberg & Dorr (1998) found that 
switching increases to 38% when another person makes the final 
decision to switch or stay. That is, one person would make the 
initial selection and a second person, who is not committed one 
way or the other to the first person’s selection, makes the final 
decision. This significant increase in switching provides some sup-
port for the idea that the propensity to stay comes from a false 
illusion of control. When this illusion is lessened or removed, the 
likelihood of a switch increases. However, having the initial guess 
made by another person did not offer an advantage in the long 
run. In trials 21-50, the one-person players were switching at the 
same rate as the two-person players (about 50% of the time).
Cognitive Illusion. The MHD may be difficult to solve because 
it is so uniquely contrived and humans are not designed for ob-
jective information processing in this domain. I’ve heard statis-
ticians say that the human brain is simply not wired for dealing 
with many issues of statistical probability. However, the Monty 
Hall game is not complex and does not require differential calcu-
lus equations or sophisticated mathematics to play. One reason 
the problem is so appealing is because of its simplicity. It is a 
charming two-stage conditional probability problem where one 
makes a tentative decision, gains information, and makes a final 
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commitment. I disagree with those who are tempted to treat 
the problem as an interesting but artificial puzzle that does not 
warrant the attention of psychology. The MHD deserves consid-
eration because it is an example of something humans don’t do 
very well. One way to merge the MHD with the teaching of hu-
man cognition is to use this game as an example of something at 
which humans are not very good. As teachers of psychology, we 
should be curious about behaviors that reduce success as well as 
behaviors that lead to successful outcomes.
Real World Analogs and  
Structural Variations
I like to ask students to think of real life examples of the MHD. 
Are there any? To answer this one must find situations outside 
the lab that meet these criteria: (1) choices must be made that 
involve no prior knowledge about the different options; (2) there 
exists the equivalent of a knowledgeable host who knows the 
“winning” option as well as your choice; (3) the host is capable 
of and willing to reveal an incorrect answer. I am unaware of any 
equivalent context shift for the MHD, but the point of thinking 
about real world analogs is to entertain the idea that people are 
learning how to solve the problem in life tasks that could be 
applied to this problem. The goal is not necessarily to get people 
to perform better on the Monty Hall show, but to see if shifting 
contexts will result in better performance – thus shedding light 
on some aspect of human information processing.
This approach is similar to some fascinating work on the 
evolution of cheater detection that involved looking at how in-
dividuals navigate through tasks that are constructed differently 
(Cosmides, 1989). This research has shown that people perform 
poorly on the Wason selection task when it is presented in its 
traditional form as a logic puzzle with numbers and letters (e.g., 
“if P then Q” or “if A then 4”). However, when the problem is 
reformulated as an ecologically valid cheater detection task (e.g., 
“in order to drink beer one must be over 21”) people perform 
much better. The argument is that the human brain is quite capa-
ble of reasoning through the problem when it is placed in a more 
familiar context. Would performance on the MHD improve if 
one could find a similar context shift? Over the years I’ve heard a 
slew of examples of real world analogs from students. These have 
been thought provoking but, for various reasons, all have failed 
to match the conditions for an ecologically valid MHD. Here are 
a few examples. 
Imagine betting on a horse race with only three entries and 
you put your money on horse 1. Midway through the race, horse 
3 falls over and is no longer a contender. Assuming the track 
would allow you to switch your bet during the race, should you 
now put your money on horse 2? The correct answer is “no” 
because this scenario lacks someone who knows the correct 
answer. Seymann (1991) refers to the complication in this exam-
ple as a “problem definition.” The information provided by horse 
3 is not dependent on your initial pick, thus, it is irrelevant. This 
may partly explain why people perform poorly on the MHD – in 
real life there is rarely a situation where an all-knowing host is 
participating in our decisions.
An example from a typical grocery store looks like a good 
candidate for a Monty Hall situation. We’ve all been in the posi-
tion to choose between several (perhaps even 3) checkout lines 
at the grocery store. Once committed to a line there is often 
a temptation to switch to a faster moving line. This superficial-
ly represents the dilemma, but is not true in structure. As with 
the horse racing example, there is no knowledgeable host. In 
addition, there is a great deal of available information to take 
into account such as the speed of each cashier, the number of 
customers in each line, and the quantity of items in each shop-
per’s basket. The MHD does not allow for this much additional 
information.
Students interested in the psychology of religion and the 
perception of higher powers might be inclined to place God, or 
some equivalent entity, in the position of the game show host. 
This scenario comes fairly close to satisfying the criteria because, 
unlike the previous examples, it includes a knowledgeable host. 
One could assume that people face difficult choices in life (the 
three doors), some superior being knows the correct path in life 
(the honest game show host), and he, she, or it is willing to reveal 
an incorrect option (behind one of the doors is a goat). This anal-
ogy works up to a point and students will have fun dissecting it. 
“When God closes a door he opens a window,” said one student 
referring to the popular expression about the mysterious ways 
of religion. Close, but no cigar. Other students were quick to 
point out that this message conveys meaning about the commit-
ment to a wrong choice – not information about some option 
we did not take. If Monty Hall were to adhere to this aphorism 
he would just show people that their initial choice was wrong! 
Sorry, you picked a goat. Now try another door. 
Returning to more practical teaching applications, the dilem-
ma can be used to introduce specific techniques that social, per-
sonality, and developmental psychologists might use. Researchers 
have yet to explore basic correlations between strategy choices 
and aspects of personality. This approach would be useful in de-
riving broad personality profiles of successful and unsuccessful 
players. Or, students could generate more specific predictions. 
Using a personality inventory, one might be able to differentiate 
the people who are unsuccessful at optimally solving this task 
from the small number of individuals who are successful on the 
initial trial. (e.g., those who are able to negotiate the dilemma 
correctly tend to be higher on “neuroticism” or “risk taking”). A 
developmental psychology approach might include a discussion 
of the emergence of traits along a developmental timeline. If the 
MHD is related to emotions such as regret, guilt, or pain it could 
be fruitful to examine children’s performance on this task before 
and after those emotions take shape. Perhaps certain children 
will demonstrate remarkable levels of switching, even outper-
forming adults? This lesson could be coupled with a discussion 
both children’s and adults’ tendencies to change strategies as a 
result of observational learning. Who is more likely to change 
playing patterns after watching someone repeatedly win or lose 
using the two strategies? The applications are wide ranging and 
the game provides a starting point for a myriad of investigative 
questions that call for creative, analytical, and practical thinking.
REFLECTIONS AND  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
MHD is an effective and engaging learning tool that prompts 
students to apply psychology in novel and productive ways to 
a 50-year-old game show. This learning tool fits in nicely with 
the values promoted by the growing SoTL movement. Building 
on past assessment traditions in higher education, the SoTL ap-
proach is designed to develop pedagogical expertise through re-
flection, analysis, and public promotion inquiry findings. Future 
4
Monty Hall Dilemma
https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2018.120213
research in this area should attempt to measure empirically the 
increase in learning using MHD. For example, is it the case that 
students in statistics classes who work with MHD also under-
stand probability theory in general? The experimental design for 
such an inquiry would likely involve assessing math and probabil-
ity skills using a between-subjects design. One group of students 
would get the MHD treatment, the other group would get tradi-
tional teaching approaches to probability concepts. All students 
would then be measured for knowledge gains in this area. 
Regardless of how much time and attention you give to the 
issue of explaining the MHD, it is well worth your while to in-
troduce the problem in class. In my statistics courses I like to 
present the problem on the first day of class with a cliff-hanger 
ending that promises the correct solution when we get to the 
course material covering probability (Bennett, 2004). In other 
courses, the problem is discussed at length in one class period 
and concludes with the request that students pursue the topic 
further. Or, use it as an end of the semester laboratory that urges 
students to tap into their psychology breadth for answers and 
discussion. 
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